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The ‘bias’ paradox -I






Several feminists have criticised several
scientific theories for their sexist biases (e.g.
Longino, 1990)
But feminists have also generally argued that
value-free and impartial theories are
impossible (e.g. Harding, 1986).
This situation seemingly leads to a paradox:




if bias is inevitable, then it is pointless to criticise others for being
biased (Antony, 1993).
If impartiality is impossible, then it is futile to criticise others for
being partial. But if impartiality is possible and a good thing, then
feminist values cannot play any positive role (Anderson, 2002, 498)

The ‘bias’ paradox -II




Some critics of feminist epistemology
advocate on feminist grounds support for
value free enquiry (Cf. Haack, 1997).
Others attempt to develop a criterion to
determine which values, and in which roles,
can legitimately play a role in the justification
of theories (e.g., Antony, 1993 and Anderson,
1995, 20002 and 2004)

Value Neutrality and Impartiality


There are at least senses in which science could be
objective (Cf Lacey, 1999 and 2002; Anderson, 2002
and 2004):




Value-neutrality: Scientific theories do not imply or
presuppose any noncognitive intrinsic value judgements, nor
do scientific theories serve any particular non-cognitive
values more fully than others (Anderson, 2002, p. 497 and
2004, p. 3)
Impartiality: The only grounds for accepting a theory are its
relations to the evidence and their manifestations of the
cognitive values. These grounds are impartial among rival
noncognitive values (Anderson, 2002, p. 497 and 2004, p. 3)

Values and the goals of enquiry






Value-neutrality and impartiality are
themselves evaluative concepts.
Their value will depend on whether they
promote the ends or goals of enquiry.
The ends or goals of enquiry are:




Knowledge or truth (Anderson, 2002, 498)
Significance or relevance (Anderson, 2002, 498)
Understanding

The case against value-neutrality







Value-neutrality undermines the goal of
producing significant truths, because
assessments of significance depend on valueladen judgements.
Significance is an evaluative matter
Cognitive values are not enough to determine
significance.
Significance is relative to practical interests,
sociopolitical and moral values.

The legitimate justificatory
roles of non-cognitive values


Three ways in which contextual values matter
to theory choice:






Values contribute to determining standards of
significance and adequacy to be met by theories.
Values contribute to the classification of objects
and phenomena into kinds.
Values contribute to choices of methods since
some possibilities can only explored by the use of
some methods rather than others.

Value neutrality is not a value







One aim of enquiry is the production of
knowledge which is significant or relevant
What makes an item of knowledge significant
or relevant is often relative to one’s
contextual values or interests.
Therefore, contextual values are among the
determinants of which theories should be
accepted as containing significant knowledge.
Therefore, value neutrality is not an ideal or a
value to be adopted in enquiry.

Anderson’s case for impartiality


A provisional view:






The only grounds for accepting a theory as true
are those permitted by the value of impartiality.
Contextual values contribute to determining the
choice of the most significant theory among those
which are legitimately accepted as true.

Impartiality does not require value neutrality.

Problems for the provisional view


Undermining the provisional view:








The theory itself can include concepts which are evaluative (e.g.,
employed; pathogenic; dominant).
The evidence itself can include facts which are the result of social
intervention.
The ranking of cognitive values and their distinction from noncognitive ones is itself an evaluative matter which depends on
socio-political values

Evidence for a theory is NOT independent of contextual values







How data are classified can be value-dependent
Whether some data exist can depend on value driven social
intervention
Which cognitive values matter most can be driven by contextual
values
How telling some data is, depends on which alternatives should be
considered (and that is a value driven matter of significance)

Is impartiality a value? Which
value?




The problems with the provisional view lead Anderson to revise
impartiality.
Revision 1: the grounds adduced to justify a theory should be based on
standards that transcend the competing interests of advocates of rival
views (Anderson, 1995).





No further than original view
A problematic moral reading (moral impartiality is the only legitimate value)

Revision 2: ’Given the same background assumptions, and accepting
the conceptual frameworks of all hypotheses for the sake of argument,
all rational inquirers will agree on the direction of support a given body
of new evidence offers to rival hypotheses, regardless of the value
judgements they accept' (Anderson, 2002, 514).


A very weak definition which is of no use in theory choice

In praise of partiality-I


But why think impartiality is a value?


Assumed that value judgments do not stand in evidential
connections with factual judgements.




Assumed that value judgments are never rationally held (or are all
on a par) and in particular that final ends are never rationally
chosen.






Clearly false as we know from the Frege-Geach problem for
expressivism.

Values are not on a par. It is still a matter of debate whether final ends
can be rationally chosen.

If these assumptions are rejected, then there is no reason why
values could not be included among the evidence for accepting
a theory.
This is not accepting propaganda- values too like the rest of the
evidence should be subjected to scrutiny.

In praise of partiality-II


What sort of scrutiny?








Values must be viable: they must not presuppose factual
claims that are incompatible with properly accepted theories.
Values must be epistemically fruitful: they support theories
which manifest cognitive values to a high degree
Values must be rationally defensible on moral grounds

It does not mean that the same values should be
rationally held by everybody (what is intrinsically
valuable for a person may depend on their
circumstances.)

Answering the Paradox


The use of contextual values in the justification of
theory is legitimate iff:






The values themselves are justified on grounds which
are independent of the theory they support.
The values are viable and epistemically fruitful.

Local epistemology: which intrinsic values are
rationally held might depend on
circumstances that vary from person to
person

Standpoint and Empiricism: A
Re-assessment




The standpoint of the oppressed is
epistemically privileged.
The values which are rationally held by
those whose circumstances are
oppressive are more likely to be both
viable and fruitful.

